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Multi-sourcing arrangements are a major trend in the contemporary outsourcing landscape, 
but our understanding of what makes these complex ventures effective remains relatively 
fragmented. Our study focuses on the multi-sourcing and opportunistic behavior of service 
providers, and in particular a relatively neglected but major driver of opportunistic behavior, 
namely the uncertainty surrounding the transaction. Developing an extended transaction cost 
economics perspective, our investigation focuses on the roles of internal and behavioral 
uncertainty and the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. We research a rich multi-sourcing 
case study within the financial services sector and compare and re-analyze a detailed case in 
the literature. According to our findings, internal uncertainty creates an ‘alignment of actions’ 
problem between outsourcing partners, while behavioral uncertainty can shape an ‘alignment   
of objectives’ problem, leading to the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. Our findings 
further contribute to a more thorough understanding of ways to reduce these uncertainties and 
facilitate coopetition between multiple vendors. 
 







IT outsourcing has emerged as an important tool for enabling organizations to enhance their 
growth and competitiveness. Firms have become more mature in their outsourcing ventures 
and have progressed to externalizing more complex functions that often involve multiple 
vendors. Multi-sourcing, that is using multiple sources, to deliver service requirements has 
been a major trend in information technology outsourcing (ITO) and business process 
outsourcing (BPO) for over 25 years (Cullen, Lacity and Willcocks, 2014). But ITO/BPO 
models have evolved even further in the past decade, and large outsourcing deals with a 
single supplier have been increasingly replaced by several selective contracts with a set of 
suppliers (Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra 2010; Lacity, Khan and Yan, 2016; Snowden and 
Fersht, 2016).  
 
In parallel with the massive growth of outsourcing and multi-sourcing arrangements, the 
existence of opportunistic behavior between the outsourcing partners has been widely 
acknowledged  as  of  central  concern  in  outsourcing  activities  (Aubert,  Patry  and Rivard, 
2004; Lacity, Willcocks and Khan, 2011). Opportunistic behavior can hinder collaborative 
activity, putting the effectiveness of outsourcing arrangements in danger. The risks and 
threats of such behavior become even more prominent in multi-sourcing arrangements 




Multi-sourcing arrangements constitute a distinctive context for the study of opportunistic 
behavior primarily for two reasons. First, multi-sourcing ventures are inherently more 
complex and therefore involve higher levels of uncertainty, as compared to dyadic 
outsourcing relationships. Clients need to manage a greater number of vendors at the same 
time, which inherently increases the uncertainty level they have to deal with. 
 
Second, in contrast to earlier (and more traditional) outsourcing arrangements, contemporary 
multi-sourcing ventures are seeking to capitalize on the co-operation as well as the 
competition amongst outsourcing partners. This dual challenge of voluntary ‘coopetition’ 
(Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996; Osarenkhoe, 2010:216) or forced-by-the-client 
‘coopetition’ (Wiener and Saunders, 2014), represents a distinctive feature of multi-sourcing 
ventures that differs from traditional dyadic outsourcing arrangements.  
 
Recent studies in the area of multi-sourcing make strong contributions but also suggest that 
much still needs to be done to fully reveal the challenges that these complex ventures present 
and the effective practices that might steer them (Wiener & Saunders, 2014; Bapna, Barua, 
Mani and Mehra, 2010). More specifically, we currently have little understanding of how 
uncertainty challenges increase the risk for opportunistic behavior in a multi-sourcing 
context. There is also a scarcity of studies that investigate ways of reducing uncertainties, 
potentially facilitating therefore, as Wiener and Saunders (2014) suggest, the development of 
coopetition in a multi-sourcing context.  
 
In this study, we aim to address these two issues and contribute to the literature on 
outsourcing by exploring opportunistic behavior in a multi-sourcing context, a theme that, to 
the best of our knowledge, has not been investigated in depth. Our primary research questions 
are going to be ‘How does the existence of internal and behavioral uncertainties in a multi-
sourcing arrangement increase the likelihood of opportunistic behavior? How do clients and 
their suppliers seek to reduce these uncertainties and their impact? 
 
We adopt a transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective to underpin our analysis since it 
has prevailed as a dominant (if criticised) theory in the explanation of phenomena related to 
opportunism. We aim to contribute to the outsourcing literature by providing a more thorough 
understanding of the role of uncertainty in the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in a 
multi-sourcing context. The findings from our study help to provide new insights on the 
conditions that reduce uncertainty and opportunistic behavior in multi-sourcing, and therefore 
enable the customer to develop coopetition between vendors.  
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Multi-sourcing arrangements and the threat of opportunistic behavior 
 
The growth of multi-sourcing arrangements has been attributed to using best-in-class vendors 
for specific work as well as the synergistic effects that collaboration between different 
vendors can bring. Clients are able to access the specialized expertise and capabilities of 
multiple vendors and receive agile and flexible services (Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra, 
2010; Lacity, Khan and Yan, 2016).  
 
Multi-sourcing arrangements also may result in other benefits; for example, the spread of 
outsourcing risks amongst multiple vendors, the reduction of dependency by the client as well 
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as improved adaptability to changing market conditions (Koo, Lee, Heng and Park, 2016; 
Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra, 2010). Multi-sourcing can also help clients source best-of-
breed suppliers, reduce over-reliance on a single supplier, offer greater flexibility and control, 
promote competition and prevent complacency.   
 
On the other hand, multi-sourcing brings very significant challenges and risks. Governance 
becomes more complex, and transaction costs rise with the increased management challenges 
(Cullen, Lacity and Willcocks, 2014). Research has revealed difficulties, including the design 
of interdependent contracts between independent providers, multi-party interfaces and 
handovers, end-to-end process management, and governance challenges (Parida, Wincent and 
Oghazi, 2016; Cullen, Lacity and Willcocks, 2014; Lioliou, Zimmermann, Willcocks and 
Gao, 2014).  
 
Emerging risks include attracting the market for smaller slices of work, keeping providers 
interested and incentivized, integrating complexity and tracing accountability (Oshri, 
Kotlarsky and Willcocks, 2011). In practice, suppliers also incur more transaction costs due 
to shorter contract length, more competition for a greater number of small-sized deals and 
more frequent bidding for contracts (Cullen, Lacity and Willcocks, 2014). In all this, the 
possibility for providers’ opportunistic behavior may well rise.  
 
Opportunistic behavior in a multi-sourcing context, while a major concern and challenge, has 
received relatively little academic investigation (Wiener and Saunders, 2014; Bapna, Barua, 
Mani and Mehra, 2010). While this very significant theme has rarely been explicitly 
researched, there are a few rich cases in the literature where the issue and the counter-tactics 
can be identified. One such case, particularly thorough and holistic in illustrating the 
evolution of the multi-sourcing arrangement, is that of Adidas (Aubert, Saunders, Wiener et 
al., 2014). Since the Adidas case is representative of the issues, but takes a different path 
from our researched DUTCH case study, we will use it further for comparative purposes in 
our analysis section below. 
 
The Adidas case is interesting because while its authors in their comprehensive descriptions 
and overviews are clearly raising issues of opportunism, they do not address these issues 
conceptually or explicitly in their study. Evidently the distinctive features of multi-sourcing 
create ample space for the existence of opportunism  and can put at risk the effectiveness of 
an entire venture.  
 
As will be illustrated, Adidas represents a multi-sourcing case that established a high degree 
of overlap in the work of the vendors and, relatedly, high supplier competition. In our own 
DUTCH case study, there were limited overlaps in the work of the vendors, and competition 
between them was relatively low. In both cases, however, (as happens in multi-sourcing), the 
clients aspired to exploit the benefits of the vendor’s collaboration and synergistic endeavour. 
We therefore use the Adidas case study for its points of contrast to our own DUTCH case 
study, providing a fruitful avenue for comparative analysis.  
 
Uncertainty, opportunism and transaction cost economics 
 
The theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) has been widely used in the study of 
outsourcing. Transaction cost theorists have primarily focused on explaining governance 
choices (i.e. in-house, joint ventures, outsourcing, markets) in conjunction with the potential 
for vendor opportunistic behavior (Tiwana and Bush, 2007; Aubert, Patry and Rivard, 2004). 
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Uncertainty is generated by phenomena that are hard to anticipate and, consequently, hard to 
specify in the contract. Taking into account the broadness of uncertainty as a concept, we 
observe that a number of TCE studies have operationalized uncertainty in a relatively 
constrained manner. TCE studies so far, have taken into account certain facets of uncertainty 
while ignoring others or neglecting the role of uncertainty altogether (Thouin, Hoffman and 
Fort, 2009; De Vita, Tekaya and Wang, 2010).  
 
Williamson (1985) did not provide a very detailed definition of uncertainty, but referred to 
the work of Koopmans (1957) and progressed to identify three classes of uncertainty. Firstly, 
the primary class of uncertainty which is ‘state contingent’. The secondary class, which arises 
from a lack of timely and accurate communication which, however, is innocent and non-
strategic in nature. Williamson further identified ‘behavioral’ uncertainty to refer to all those 
cases where there is strategic non-disclosure, disguise or distortion of information.   
 
Williamson’s conceptualization has not been sufficiently concrete to operationalize and 
further transaction cost economics studies distinguished between environmental, internal and 
behavioral types of uncertainty in the organizational context. Framed in this manner, 
environmental uncertainty tends to reflect Williamson’s conceptualization of primary 
uncertainty; internal uncertainty resembles Williamson’s conceptualization of secondary 
uncertainty; behavioral uncertainty corresponds to Williamson’s third type of uncertainty.  
 
In our study, we focus on aspects of internal and behavioral uncertainty, as our research 
respondents did not bring forward any major issues of environmental uncertainty affecting 
their arrangements. In particular, regarding internal uncertainty, we will initially focus on the 
ability of a firm to define precisely its IT requirements and services. Furthermore, we follow 
Aubert, Partry and Rivard (2004) and examine the level of professionalization of the IT 
department. We also follow Lacity, Willcocks and Khan (2011) as well as Karimi-
Alaghehband et al (2011) and pay particular consideration to measurement difficulties, which 
we also classify as elements of internal uncertainty.  
 
Behavioral uncertainty stems from difficulties in predicting the actions of the exchange party, 
in the face of the possibility of opportunistic behavior. In practice, a number of TCE studies 
tend to relate behavioral uncertainty to the difficulty of measuring the performance of the 
vendor. We follow Lacity, Willcocks and Khan (2011), as well as Karimi-Alaghehband et al 
(2011) and argue that this link departs from the core of TCE, and therefore we focus our 
assessment on possibilities for opportunistic behavior that the supplier may engage in.   
 
With regard to his views on opportunism, Williamson defined opportunism as ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985). On this basis, he suggested that opportunism 
combines (i) self-interest seeking with (ii) dishonest behavior, such as the ‘incomplete or 
distorted disclosure of information, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or otherwise confuse’ (Williamson, 1985: 47). 
 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996, p.18) and later, Das and Rahman (2002), distinguished between 
the attitude of opportunism and its behavioral manifestation, that is, the occurrence of 
opportunistic behavior. The authors asserted that research should differentiate between these 
two facets of opportunism and referred to the attitudinal facet of opportunism as 
‘opportunistic  propensity’. Opportunistic propensity therefore refers to a firm’s willingness 
to engage in self-interested activity. Opportunistic behavior, on the other hand, refers to the 




In our study, therefore, we examine opportunistic propensity by investigating whether the 
arrangement is based on relational, open-ended elements or on formal contracts and 
safeguards. We then examine the existence of opportunistic behavior, based on narratives 
around the evolution of the outsourcing relationship in the context of multi-sourcing 
arrangements. Our research aims to provide an exploratory understanding of how the 
existence of internal and behavioral uncertainties increases the risk of opportunistic behavior 
in a multi-sourcing context.  
 
The following graph illustrates the guiding framework for our analysis:  
 






The chosen research strategy is the case study research method. The case study research 
method is considered suitable because it enables the researcher to study contemporary 
phenomena over which he/she has little or no control and examine the context within which 
these phenomena take place (Yin, 2003). Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) suggested 
that a single in-depth case study can be an appropriate method to test  the  boundaries  of  
well-formed  theory,  which  is  exactly  what  we  wanted  to achieve with the theory of 
transaction cost economics. Along these lines, our intention was to conduct an in-depth case 
study that would enable us to examine and understand the predictive power of the theory of 
transaction costs on sourcing decisions, and the choice of governance in-depth and across 
time. The participant organization is a major financial services company from the 
Netherlands. We name the firm DUTCH for reasons of confidentiality. At the same time, we 
use a rich case study from the published literature – Adidas – to compare and contrast our 
findings and give analytical insight into the factors at play and how they shape events. 
 
DUTCH offers a wide range of services including insurance, banking and mortgage products 
to consumers, businesses and institutions, and employs more than 22,000 employees in more 
than ten business and service units. The company initiated a major strategic multi-sourcing 
initiative in 2007 with three suppliers.   
 
The entire deal represented a combined value of more than 415 million Euros. As mentioned, 
this deal represents a multi-vendor dominant model and the client created three different 
contracts with each of the suppliers, and was also exclusively responsible for their 
management. Our investigation was focused on all three strategic outsourcing contracts, 
which started at the same time in 2007, thus forming natural controls for the research process. 
All three contracts were medium term and would run for five years. The three suppliers will 
be named Supplier A, Supplier B and Supplier C respectively. 
 
Supplier A is an international IT services provider specializing in managing and transforming 
the IT operations of its customers. It is based in France and it offers a variety of services 
ranging from data centers and workplace solutions to infrastructure and information security 
solutions. Supplier B is a leading telecommunications and ICT service provider in the 
Netherlands. It offers products including internet, wireless telephony and TV to consumers as 
well as integrated ICT services to business customers. Supplier C is a global supplier of 
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information and communication technology services. It offers workspace management, 
security, communications as well as application and technology transformation services. It is 
headquartered in the Netherlands and employees about 25,000 people. As from October 
2007, Supplier C became part of Supplier B. 
 
We used multiple data collection methods in order to provide a stronger substantiation of our 
theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989). We conducted a total of twenty interviews from 
November 2009 to January 2010 and viewed the three outsourcing contracts under 
investigation. We sought to improve the reliability of our findings and triangulate our results 
by questioning interviewees on some common themes, both from the suppliers’ and the 
client’s side. Having the chance to view the three outsourcing contracts also enabled us to get 
a good understanding of the contractual apparatus of governance in place and get the 
reflections of our research participants on this. We had one interview with each of our 
thirteen research participants and an additional interview with seven of them. All interviews 
lasted approximately one hour. The interviews were cross-sectional and were based on 
participants’ recollections. The interviews were then transcribed, coded and analyzed using 
Atlas software.  
 
We followed an iterative process in our data analysis and compared emergent findings and 
pre-existing concepts (Eisenhardt, 1989). The DUTCH case study was a multi-sourcing 
arrangement characterized by high levels of modularity and low competition between the 
three suppliers. However, the evolution of the relationships and the performance of the three 
suppliers was different. We found these discrepancies intriguing and we considered that a 
TCE theorization could illuminate various elements critical for the progress of the venture. 
Our subsequent data analysis enabled us to identify particular elements of uncertainty and 
provide insights on how opportunistic behavior can emerge in a multi-sourcing context.  
 
We adopted a procedure of template analysis (King, 2004) while coding our data, which was 
informed by the TCE theorization. Our interviewees did not raise significant issues relating to 
environmental uncertainty, and we therefore focused our analysis on aspects of internal and 
behavioral types of uncertainty, opportunistic propensity and opportunistic behavior. On the 
basis of the responses of our participants we created codes for each of these elements. The 
main codes and indicative quotes are provided in the Appendix. Using these codes, we 
followed an inductive approach in our data analysis.  
 
To ensure a rigorous and valid interpretation of our data, we conducted many iterations of 
analysis, but we also re-visited our interview transcripts and other documents multiple times. 
Our intention while following this iterative process was to ‘understand the whole’ by 
constantly revising it in ‘view of the reinterpretation of the parts’ (Myers, 1995). Table 1 
summarizes the roles of the research participants we interviewed. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In this study, we aim to provide an in-depth analysis by comparing and contrasting our 
observations against a complementary study mentioned in the literature review, namely the 
Adidas case study by Aubert, Saunders, Wiener et al, (2014). We set up this comparison and 
contrast in order to more systematically analyze the management and the co-ordination 
efforts of DUTCH and Adidas, as well as their actions to incentivize their vendors. Within 
this context, we compare and contrast a case study of low overlaps of work and low 
competition between the vendors (DUTCH) with a case study of high overlaps of work and 
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high competition (Adidas). The following sections will present aspects of opportunistic 




CASE STUDY IN DUTCH FINANCIAL SERVICES  
 
Overview of the arrangement  
 
In 2004 DUTCH engaged in its first IT outsourcing venture with Supplier A on mainframe 
operations. The main reasons DUTCH decided to engage in this IT outsourcing venture were 
related to the reduction of cost and the fact that the mainframe operations were not 
considered part of the company’s core business. It was thus considered that outsourcing was a 
good strategy to utilize the technical expertise and competencies of a supplier specialized in 
this area. The outsourcing venture between DUTCH and Supplier A progressed successfully 
and resulted in significant cost reductions for DUTCH. The company thus decided to develop 
further its outsourcing scope, and at the end of 2007 signed a major multi-sourcing deal with 
three suppliers. 
The entire 2007 deal with the three suppliers represented a combined value of more than 415 
million Euros. All three contracts would run for five years. Supplier A would provide the 
datacenter services for DUTCH and focus on the availability, continuity and security of the 
service. The contract between DUTCH and Supplier A was worth 145 million Euros. 
Supplier B would provide communication services including land lines, mobile 
communications and data networks. The contract between DUTCH and Supplier B was worth 
150 million Euros. Supplier C would be responsible for the management and further 
development of the workstation infrastructure. The company would be providing workstation 
systems for the entire DUTCH staff. The contract between DUTCH and Supplier C was 
worth 120 million Euros.  
As an overview, across the 2007-2010 period, Supplier A performed well most of the time, 
and DUTCH did not appear to have serious issues with regard its performance. As illustrated 
later, there were some instances where DUTCH felt exploited by Supplier A, but there were 
no serious performance issues. Supplier B did not perform well during the initial phases of 
the arrangement, but its performance improved over time. There were many instances of 
mutual blame between DUTCH and Supplier B but, over time, and as the arrangement 
became more formalized, these instances became less frequent. The performance of supplier 
C, however, was disappointing throughout. Despite the advancement of DUTCH’s 
governance capabilities and the noticeable performance improvements of the other suppliers 




Aspects of opportunistic propensity  
 
Having been engaged in only one outsourcing arrangement up to 2007, DUTCH was 
relatively inexperienced in outsourcing, and not at all experienced in multi-sourcing when it 
signed this major three supplier deal. Although they were about to enter a very big multi-
sourcing arrangement, they did not perform a formal RFP process that would have allowed 
them to compare different service delivery options. This was also the case in 2004 when 




From our interviews, we established that DUTCH did not engage in a formal RFP process 
because it did not really have a good understanding of what the market could offer or what 
solution would fit them best. They were hoping that by outsourcing they could get the help of 
their partners to sort out their own IT requirements. Furthermore, DUTCH was in favor of 
informal ways of doing work and did not put much detail in the contracts with its three 
suppliers. The company preferred to rely on a spirit of partnership and RP3 (DUTCH sector 
manager on IT operations) reflected on this issue:“We were convinced, seeing all the 
different outsourcing in the market at that moment, the only way to make it successful is when 
you try to establish a real partnership. That was our goal when we started”. Subsequently, 
the contracts that DUTCH signed were not sufficiently detailed, leaving room for ambiguity 
and differing interpretations. 
According to our respondents, the choice by DUTCH to execute the deal primarily based on 
informal relationships was not a wise move and it increased the levels of opportunistic 
propensity for its three suppliers. The suppliers took advantage of the absence of a formal 
arrangement to charge more and justify (when needed) underperformance. DUTCH soon 
realized that the formalization of obligations and responsibilities around the arrangement was 
crucial to getting the project going and avoid losses. Our respondents expressed the concern 
that DUTCH was exploited for some time (primarily from Suppliers B and C, but to some 
extent by A too), and that more formalization was the only way to move things forward in a 
positive way.  
In what follows, we will provide an overview of the various uncertainties prevailing in the 
internal operating environment within DUTCH, as well as the hazards of behavioral 
uncertainty the company faced. We will also illustrate the various ways in which DUTCH 
tried to reduce these uncertainties, and their impact.  
 
Internal uncertainty  
 
Research participants within DUTCH indicated that their organization was not capable of 
clarifying their needs and requirements. This increased the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior by the vendors, enabling them to blame DUTCH for lack of clarity and therefore 
justify time overruns or under performance. RP1 (DUTCH IT director) recognized that 
DUTCH had a very limited understanding of its own IT business needs and indicated:“We 
should have been more accurate because if you outsource garbage, you get garbage back”.  
DUTCH was also constantly making very specialized requests to its suppliers, which 
indicated some lack of discipline. RP7 (Contract manager for Supplier B) reflected on this 
issue:“DUTCH wants everything as a specialty, really everything has a high priority and it’s 
not standardized.  We contracted PDC where all our products are designed, because we 
wanted to take standard products from Supplier B and Supplier C. The ink wasn’t even dry 
and we had a specialty”. While Supplier B had trouble accommodating the non-standardized 
requirements of DUTCH, it did manage to finally take care of them, though with some time 
delays. RP7 (Contract manager for Supplier B) indicated that DUTCH was a very demanding 
customer and that some delays by Supplier B could be justified, but often these were too long. 
In the case of Supplier C, the situation was worse. The internal organization of Supplier C 
was not consistent, and consequently their ability to accommodate non-standard requests 
from DUTCH was limited. Sometimes Supplier C would blame DUTCH for making non-
standardized requests in order to justify their own underperformance.  
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Furthermore, the internal organization within DUTCH at the time that these outsourcing 
contracts were signed appeared to be relatively weak. A major problem had to do with the 
diverse mindsets that existed within the company. DUTCH has been the product of a number 
of mergers and acquisitions, resulting in a diverse infrastructure and varying philosophies on 
how IT should be managed. Consequently, the complexity of the tasks was significant. RP13 
(Contract manager from Supplier C) noted: ‘You (have) got a kaleidoscopic  IT  world  within  
DUTCH  itself  which  is relatively unmanageable. If you want to outsource … it really 
becomes a mess’. This situation increased the possibility that the suppliers would behave 
opportunistically. 
 
DUTCH did not have a good command of the environment but, to make matters worse, it also 
did not have proper measurement and control mechanisms in place. By not establishing 
proper measurement and control mechanisms, the contracts were not effective in preventing 
vendors from behaving opportunistically. This was particularly the case with Supplier B and 
Supplier C which for a long time were claiming much better levels of performance than they 
were, in practice, putting in.  
 
Furthermore, although DUTCH settled on making rough estimations about its IT needs, it 
was not capable of making valid assessments. As one example amongst many, when DUTCH 
calculated the storage capacity they would need from Supplier A their miscalculation was 
huge. DUTCH signed a deal worth EUR 120 million with Supplier A, but it turned out that 
the deal had to become much larger in order to accommodate the requirements of DUTCH. 
The final deal reached EUR 200 million (which represents a 66.7% deviation upwards) and, 
according to DUTCH respondents, Supplier A took the opportunity to over-charge on 
additional services. 
 
An over-reliance on a spirit of partnership, and the weak IT management capability of 
DUTCH, did not work well for any of the three arrangements. Respondents from DUTCH 
raised concerns that Supplier A, although reliable in terms of performance, took advantage of 
the weak IT management capability of DUTCH.  Suppliers B and C also took many 
opportunities to offer excuses when their performance was poor. In essence, they were trying 
to escape responsibility for their variable performances.  
 
In the case of Supplier C, while DUTCH tried to establish some measurement mechanisms, 
these were not effective. Some of the metrics were not disaggregated enough to challenge the 
supplier on exactly where they were failing. Furthermore, these metrics were averaged too 
much so that the supplier performance looked quite good at a general level, but failed to 




Behavioral uncertainty  
 
DUTCH chose to outsource to companies with which it already had some sort of business 
relationship. In a sense, prior history was assumed to be an indicator of the future 
prospects for co-operation. As mentioned, DUTCH tended to be rather informal in its 
business relationships, therefore working with companies that they had already successfully 
collaborated with was significant for them. RP3 (DUTCH Sector manager on IT operations) 
noted: “So we said, let’s divide our infrastructure into three parts and have one supplier for 
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data center, one for network and one for office automation… and in each of these parts we 
tried to see which supplier we had the best relationship with”.  
DUTCH believed that working with organizations that they already had a business 
relationship with would enable them to have some expectations with regard to their way of 
doing business and their performance. What is interesting to note, however, is that not all the 
suppliers that were chosen for this multi-sourcing arrangement had had a successful record of 
business with DUTCH, or had a very positive reputation in the market. Respondents within 
DUTCH suggested that the choice of Suppliers A and B on the basis of their previous 
performance and reputation was reasonable. However, they were very skeptical about the 
choice of Supplier C. Firstly, although DUTCH had worked with Supplier C, they did not 
have any experience with them in the workspace environment. Additionally, in 2007 when 
the Supplier C contract was signed, Supplier C appeared to have a bad image in the market.  
A number of research participants expressed their skepticism about whether Supplier C was 
chosen for good enough business reasons. RP3 (DUTCH Sector manager on IT operations) 
noted: “For Supplier A, it is more or less understandable in terms of the fact that they 
already had a sourcing contract on the mainframe side and they were doing well on that 
contract. We were very satisfied with their performance and naturally they would be the first 
party you look at when you want to outsource platforms. Supplier B was of course already a 
very important business partner for us in terms of telecommunications. The selection process 
with regard to Supplier C… I do not have it on the table nor do I care too much because I am 
just managing the existing situation. But I have my suspicions this was not a very careful, 
scientific auditable process”. It turned out, however, that the former DUTCH IT director who 
signed the Supplier C contract in 2008 went to work for Supplier C a few months after the 
closing of the deal.  
With regard to the overall orientation towards the arrangement, DUTCH was a big account 
for supplier A, and therefore a significant client. Supplier A also saw the potential for doing 
more business with DUTCH in the future, especially in the area of applications. Supplier A 
therefore, appeared very interested and involved in this agreement and this increased the 
expectation of DUTCH that Supplier A would not behave opportunistically.  
 
This was not so clearly the case with Supplier B. The development of the relationship 
between DUTCH and Supplier B had been rather patchy. An important reason for this 
appears to be that although the contract with Supplier B was big in terms of its value, 
DUTCH was not ranked among the top customers of Supplier B. RP7 (DUTCH Contract 
manager working with Supplier B) said: “I believe that they see us as one of their 
customers… Just a customer because they have bigger customers. So we are just another 
one of their customers. That is how it feels”. Therefore, because DUTCH was not a key 
customer for Supplier B, the possibility that Supplier B would not prioritize the needs of 
DUTCH was increased.  
 
Supplier C was quite indifferent to the arrangement from the start. As already mentioned, 
the choice of Supplier C was perhaps influenced by political considerations, rather than 
based on rational business criteria. The former DUTCH IT director who signed the 
contract with Supplier C went to work for Supplier C and therefore it may well be that 
with this genesis, the venture was at risk from the start. However, from our respondent 
comments, it did not appear that Supplier C was particularly interested in keeping DUTCH 








Overview of the Adidas case  
 
It is useful at this point, for comparative purposes, to describe briefly the Adidas case, and the 
issues it raises. In 2009, Adidas, as a multinational wholesale and retail sporting goods 
company, had over 1000 IT employees and outsourced to an Indian IT supplier, as well as 
having a center in Hyderabad. A new CIO felt that the single vendor had become complacent, 
and that Adidas had become too dependent on one supplier. From 2011-2013 it adopted a 
multi-sourcing strategy. It brought in two new vendors – both medium sized, one a ‘hungry’ 
Indian supplier, the other from Eastern Europe (India 2 and Belarus). Their skill sets 
overlapped significantly with those of the incumbent large Indian single supplier; this was a 
deliberate Adidas policy. Each centre of excellence in Adidas (e.g. Sales and Retail IT CofE), 
eCommerce, IT CofE - was instructed to work with at least two of the three vendors to 
deliver a full set of activities from development, testing through to integration and support. 
The relevant IT CofE was responsible for coordinating overall projects and programs. Thus, 
for any IT task Adidas could have all three suppliers bidding, creating both competition but 
also a subsequent need for cooperation across the winning suppliers. The new suppliers 
learned much, including from the large supplier, while the amount of IT work at Adidas was 
increasing so none of the suppliers experienced a decline in revenues. 
 
These arrangements had some drawbacks. They made it difficult for the vendors to achieve 
economies of scale and scope: higher transaction costs were incurred through increased 
interfaces and more bidding; Adidas had to take more final program management 
responsibility; a lot of skills replication was needed across the IT CofEs. These drawbacks 
were addressed in the Phase 2 2013-15 period. Having successfully brought on board the two 
new vendors, Adidas sought to ‘industrialise’ the IT organization by reorganizing to have 
development, testing, integration and support as separate processes across all CofEs. This 
new horizontal structure created fewer vendor overlaps but they were bigger in size, thus 
creating more volume bundling in the work bid for by the suppliers. The two new vendors 
would be assigned to each horizontal function (e.g. development) and subsequent functions 
had to be performed by different vendors. The aim was to create high levels of supplier 
competition and cooperation. The authors found that while this all reduced the number of 
interfaces considerably, the suppliers remained highly dependent on one another, had to learn 
from each other but also could bid for larger work blocks, thus leveraging economies of scale 
and scope, while Adidas reduced its coordination costs. Responsibilities also became more 
clearly demarcated. Overlapping suppliers also introduced a higher level of flexibility and 
agility than was possible using a more traditional multi-sourcing ‘best-in-class’ model with 
very few overlapping supplier activities. 
 
In the following section we compare and contrast the two cases on aspects of opportunistic 
propensity, internal uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty, as a basis for a more detailed 
discussion. 
 
Aspects of opportunistic propensity  
 
As already mentioned, DUTCH favoured informal ways of working, and therefore did not put 
much detail in the contracts with its three suppliers. This choice, however - to rely on a spirit 
of partnership rather than concrete contractual safeguards - increased the propensity of its 
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vendors to behave opportunistically. Right from the start of its multi-sourcing deal, DUTCH 
had to face issues of opportunistic behavior with all its vendors, even with Supplier A (with 
whom DUTCH had a long-standing relationship). Many respondents from DUTCH, 
including the IT director, recognized that relying on a spirit of partnership rather than a 
detailed formal contract worked against DUTCH when managing the behavior of its vendors. 
 
Adidas, on the other hand, was very rigorous in creating a strong contractual regime with its 
suppliers. This attitude of Adidas decreased the opportunistic propensity of its vendors, and, 





DUTCH had a relatively weak command of its IT environment, and was less mature in its IT 
and outsourcing management compared to Adidas. As we saw, DUTCH was the product of 
many mergers and acquisitions and had to integrate diverse IT infrastructures. The company 
did not seem to have reached a robust state of IT integration at the time that it signed its 
multi-sourcing arrangement. For this reason – immature management capability which 
resulted to a lack of robust IT platforms - the company was unable to properly measure and 
control the work of its different vendors. As a result, internal uncertainties at DUTCH 
contributed to varieties and different levels of opportunistic behavior by the three suppliers.  
 
Adidas, conversely, appeared to have a very good command of its internal IT operations. This 
was an important reason why the company was so effective in the reduction of internal 
uncertainties. Adidas was also competent in splitting IT projects amongst three vendors, 
without running into accountability issues; for  example, which vendor was responsible for 
which aspect of the work, and who got paid for delivery. Adidas appeared to have strong 
retained capability and so emerged as very competent across both phases and regimes in how 
it divided its IT work and projects between the different vendors, and also in how it 
maintained effective on-going control over vendor performance. 
 
Behavioral uncertainty  
 
As mentioned, DUTCH chose to outsource to companies with which it already had some sort 
of business relationship. In particular, DUTCH had already had a successful outsourcing 
relationship with Supplier A and later on, it expanded the arrangement and included suppliers 
B and C. The details behind these arrangements but also the scepticism around the inclusion 
of Supplier C in the contract are mentioned earlier on.  
 
With regard to Adidas, over the years of outsourcing to a single vendor, Adidas Global IT 
had begun to identify problems of over-dependency. Adidas had co-operated successfully 
with its largest supplier since 1998 and they had a good long-standing relationship, similarly 
to the DUTCH-Supplier A case. While in this case we did not find indications of 
opportunistic behavior by that supplier, Adidas itself certainly saw the need to reduce its 
dependency on a single vendor and mitigate behavioral uncertainties and opportunism. 
However, in their renewed outsourcing arrangement, they carried on their cooperation with 
India1 and brought in also India 2 and Belarus.  
 
DUTCH was valued as a client by Supplier A, but not so much by Suppliers B and C. The 
fact that DUTCH was not seen as a particularly significant account for Suppliers B and C 
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increased the likelihood of opportunistic behavior from these suppliers. The Adidas case does 
not present us with much information on how its suppliers valued it as a client; from the case 
study, however, it may be assumed that all suppliers were highly interested and highly 
involved in the arrangement and wanted to satisfy Adidas as a client. These elements reduced 
behavioral uncertainty risks for Adidas. India 1 had had a long- term relationship with 
Adidas, since 1998. The two additional vendors that were introduced in 2011 were tier-2 
suppliers, that were most likely gaining a lot of reputational benefits from their collaboration 
to Adidas. In all three cases Adidas was offering additional work, because IT was 
experiencing a rising workload across the research period. This, undoubtedly, reduced 






Comparison of the case studies has allowed us to develop insights into how opportunistic 
attitudes and behaviors on the part of vendors may arise in outsourcing and multi-sourcing 
arrangements. As previous studies also noted, we observed that multi-sourcing arrangements 
are much more complex by nature than single sourcing  arrangements  and  require  
significant  co-ordination efforts (Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra, 2010). The division of 
roles, responsibilities and accountabilities in a multi-sourcing context is much more 
demanding and the on-going governance much more challenging (Poston, Kettinger  and  
Simon,  2009). 
 
According to our findings, in the case of DUTCH, there was already high opportunistic 
propensity from the vendors as the arrangements were primarily dependent on relational 
elements and not a robust contractual regime. While previous literature has identified 
relational elements as key for successful outsourcing outcomes (Kishore, Rao, Nam, 
Rajagopalan and Chaudhury, 2003; Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl, 2008) it seems that these 
elements cannot generate benefits unless there are adequate safeguards. Relational 
governance, therefore, does not always substitute for formal governance successfully 
(Lioliou, Zimmermann, Willcocks and Gao, 2014; Huber, Fischer, Dibbern and Hirschheim, 
2013). In contrast, for Adidas, the danger of vendors' opportunistic propensity was low 
because there were detailed contracts in place, which acted as safeguards from opportunistic 
behavior. Interestingly, having established a good formal framework for the arrangement, this 
encouraged the development of a better (i.e. more effective) relationship as compared to 
DUTCH. 
 
We also found that the internal uncertainties within DUTCH shaped, in practice, an 
‘alignment of processes’ problem. This problem indicated low governance maturity and low 
IT management capability. Without proper governance mechanisms in place, DUTCH was 
not able to effectively control or coordinate the work of its suppliers. Lack of ‘alignment of 
processes’ in this sense limited the space for effective collaboration. Previous literature has 
identified that the mechanisms setting communication lines, roles and responsibilities are key 
for effective collaboration (Kotlarsky, Van Fenema and Willcocks, 2008). The absence of 
such mechanisms made collaboration very difficult indeed for DUTCH and its suppliers.  
Furthermore, DUTCH did not have a good command of its own IT environment and 
outsourcing this, therefore, exacerbated their problems. Conversely, Adidas demonstrated 
significant governance maturity and enhanced IT management capability. Internal 
uncertainties had been sorted and Adidas not only did not face significant issues related to 
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opportunistic behavior, but went forward to build collaborative efficiencies in the work of its 
vendors. 
 
We further found that behavioral uncertainties were also shaping in practice ‘alignment of 
objectives’ problems, increasing the likelihood for opportunistic behavior. Lack of alignment 
of objectives indicates an absence of common vision and orientation which hinders the   
effectiveness of the arrangement (Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks, 2011). These problems 
further inhibited the proper incentivization of the suppliers. In the absence of aligned 
objectives, suppliers were not adequately motivated to perform and, as demonstrated in the 
DUTCH case, this situation led to instances of opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
vendors. On the other hand, Adidas not only managed to align its own objectives to each of 
its suppliers individually but went further to create harmonious roles and objectives between 
its suppliers. 
 
The Adidas case shows how adept client handling can help to align and incentivize vendor 
attitudes and performance. While involving multiple vendors may reduce their motivation to 
make client-specific investments (Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra, 2010), Adidas 
demonstrated that it was capable of maintaining the interest of all its vendors. Adidas 
successfully managed to generate competitive pressure among its different suppliers and keep 
them interested in winning more projects. Adidas also cleverly created mutual objectives 
between the suppliers because they became co-dependent on one another to perform 
effectively, and gain revenues. In DUTCH conversely, without the spur of organized 
competition across the multi-vendors, opportunistic behavior emerged. 
 
The case analysis also reveals the actions clients may take to mitigate the vendors' propensity 
towards opportunism in specific circumstances. The cases are sufficiently rich and different 
to identify the major factors at work (for a summary of our results please see Figure 2). 
DUTCH was deficient in its outsourcing experience, retained capability and application of 
the full gamut of effective management practices, let alone creating and applying new ones, 
and launched the agreement over-reliant on a partnering ethos which was not present in two 
of the vendors. Inside DUTCH there was increased internal uncertainty, which reduced its 
ability to align and coordinate its processes with the vendors. The essential finding here is 
that DUTCH faced significant ‘alignment of processes’ problems that hindered work and 
created the space for opportunistic behavior.  
 
Adidas’s greater experience with outsourcing and its more mature IT management and 
governance capabilities eliminated internal uncertainties and therefore ‘alignment of 
processes’ problems from the start. In this regard, Adidas did not have to work hard to 
mitigate issues related to opportunistic behavior (as happens in a lot of multi-sourcing 
arrangements). Therefore Adidas was able to apply effective management practices identified 
in the academic literature (Cullen, Lacity and Willcocks,2014; Lacity, Khan and Yuan, 
2016), but also some novel ones, in particular that of using overlapping vendors to achieve 
keener competition, better cooperation, and superior outsourcing performance.  
 
While modularity and overlaps in work across multiple vendors can be seen in a negative 
manner, often because of the co-ordination issues they may create, the Adidas case shows 
that a firm that has good command of its internal processes (and therefore reduced internal 
uncertainty) can exploit more benefits from the simultaneous competition and co-operation 
between vendors, or ‘coopetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997; Osarenkhoe, 
2010:216). Adidas was able to maintain constructive and effective relationships with all of its 
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vendors. The climate of collaboration, but also constructive competition and learning that 
they created among the different vendors, appeared to work well.  
 
More importantly however, it seems that Adidas had adroitly managed to make each of the 
vendors shadow the work of its peers. All vendors carried similar skill sets, and their work 
often overlapped. It could therefore be concluded that, in addition to the control exercised by 
Adidas, the vendors were set up to exercise control over between them, indicating the 
development of peer control, thus mitigating the possibilities for opportunistic behavior.   
 
While ‘alignment of processes’ and ‘alignment of objectives’ problems are also evident in 
dyadic relationships, the challenge of managing these issues is exacerbated in a multi-
sourcing context. In a multi-sourcing arrangement, as shown in the case of Adidas, the client 
needs to master its internal processes in such a way that it is able to fully control the work of 
each of the vendors individually, but also between them. The possibility for the exercise of 
peer control is another unique feature to multi-sourcing, as shown in the Adidas case. 
Conversely, DUTCH was not able to master its internal IT infrastructure well and entered its 
multi-sourcing arrangement in a very weak position to exploit multi-sourcing benefits. 
DUTCH hardly knew what sort of work it was handing and what it should expect. The 
outcome of the arrangement was consistently bad, until DUTCH managed to improve its 
internal retained management and governance capabilities.  
 
Furthermore, ‘alignment of processes’ and ‘alignment of objectives’ issues in a traditional 
dyadic outsourcing relationship typically aim towards collaboration between the client and 
the supplier. In a multi-sourcing context, however, and in order to truly exploit the benefits of 
this model, ‘alignment of processes’ and ‘alignment of objectives’ should aim towards the 
cultivation of collaboration between clients and suppliers, but also the development of co-





Focusing on the distinctive context of multi-sourcing arrangements, our research makes a 
number of contributions to the outsourcing literature. First, we investigate opportunistic 
behavior in a multi-sourcing context, which is a growing field in the industry, yet still lacks 
academic investigation (Oshri, Dibbern and Kotlarsky, 2015; Wiener and Saunders, 2014; 
Bapna, Barua, Mani and Mehra, 2010). More specifically, we explicitly examine how internal 
and behavioral uncertainties create the space for the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in a 
multi-sourcing context. Our investigation demonstrated that uncertainty elements play a key 
role in covering underperformance and blurring its boundaries with purposeful opportunistic 
activity. We illustrated that while uncertainty is an element that is often neglected from the 
analysis of many TCE studies, it is a dimension that deserves further consideration, 
particularly in the investigation of opportunistic behavior.  
 
Secondly, we demonstrated that internal uncertainties shape an ‘alignment of processes’ 
problem and behavioral uncertainties create an ‘alignment of objectives’ problem which often 
result in opportunistic activity. We further illustrated that ‘alignment of processes’ problems 
are due to the lack of IT management capability and governance immaturity, while 
‘alignment of objectives’ problems can be traced to an inability to appropriately incentivize 
vendors. Vendors’ incentives should be aligned to the objectives of the client, but they should 




Thirdly, by comparing and contrasting the two cases, we were able to unpack the complexity 
associated with multi-sourcing arrangements and contribute to a more comprehensive account 
of the conditions under which coopetition between multiple vendors can be generated. In 
particular, we showed that the existence of internal and behavioral uncertainties act as 
hindrances to the development of coopetition between the vendors. In other words, under 
conditions of internal and behavioral uncertainty, multiple vendors are highly likely going to 
behave opportunistically, therefore reducing the space for the development of coopetition.  
 
In the case studies, one limitation is that we did not focus on environmental uncertainties. 
However, DUTCH vendor C showed that internal problems at a vendor due to external 
market conditions could lead to increased opportunistic behavior in relation to its outsourcing 
client DUTCH. One could also see that Adidas was experiencing rapid business growth in the 
global market during the research period. This contributed to creating more IT work for the 
multi-vendors, which certainly contributed to more cooperation and less opportunistic 
behavior than if the amount of IT work had been declining in the same period. Clearly, this 
aspect of external uncertainties and their possible correlation with opportunistic attitudes and 
behavior deserves more research attention, though it did not emerge as a major factor in the 
two case studies. 
 
Future research could therefore explore this element and elicit how environmental 
uncertainties can affect the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. In a similar vein, a wide 
range of institutional factors, competition, markets, as well as wider industry practices and 
standards should be taken into account in the examination of the possibility for opportunistic 
behavior in a multi-sourcing arrangement. 
 
Moreover, while our research has provided a point of departure, more research is needed in 
order to obtain a more profound understanding of how clients can create a regime of 
coopetition between their vendors. In particular, future research could explore how a good 
balance between the dimensions of cooperation and competition can be achieved. This theme 
of research is particularly topical, taking into account that a major driver for the growth of 
multi-sourcing is the actual exploitation of coopetitive benefits. It is also important to note 
that while the reduction of various types of uncertainties and opportunistic behavior enables 
coopetition (as shown in our findings), one could also argue that vendor coopetition can play 
a focal role in reducing opportunistic behaviors. The role of coopetition in the reduction of 
opportunistic behaviors can be further explored.  
 
Furthermore, so far relatively limited research in multi-sourcing has taken into account the 
perspectives of the suppliers. Suppliers also need to carry the constant pressure of managing 
the interfaces between client and other suppliers in their multi-sourcing deals and they also 
face the danger of opportunistic behavior from the various parties involved. This is certainly 
a very significant and promising area for further research. 
 
In addition, it needs to be recognized that while the development of coopetition in multi-
sourcing arrangements is overall seen in a positive light, it may not be desirable for all types 
of multi-sourcing arrangements. Depending on the type of service that is outsourced (and the 
level of modularity) and the client's attitude towards outsourcing, clients can make different 
decisions on the levels of collaboration they seek to develop with and between their vendors, 
as well as the levels of competition among them. Future research could further explore these 




Our findings are very relevant for practitioners, illuminating the fact that special attention has 
to be paid to the internal processes that co-ordinate work between the client and its multiple 
vendors. While the absence of effective internal processes can create risks and facilitate the 
occurrence of opportunistic behavior even in dyadic outsourcing arrangements, these hazards 
are significantly more prominent in a multi-sourcing context. This context inherently is more 
complex, therefore creating more opportunities for the vendors to obscure their actions or 
mask performance problems.  
 
Similarly, clients should be alert to the possibilities of creating more peer control among the 
different suppliers in multi-sourcing arrangements. As mentioned above, multi-sourcing can 
generate significant monitoring costs for the client; however, when vendors are set up to 
exercise control over themselves, the possibility for opportunistic behavior becomes more 
limited.  
 
Our study further underlines the importance of incentivizing the different suppliers to 
perform as well as the alignment of objectives between the various parties involved. While 
multi-sourcing arrangements can be promising in terms of propagating benefits related to the 
joint collaborative effort of the suppliers, this potential may not materialize when appropriate 
incentives do not exist. In the absence of such incentives, the space for coopetition can 
become seriously constrained, and even more importantly, the threat for opportunistic 






Alaghehband, F. K., Rivard, S., Wu, S., & Goyette, S. (2011). An assessment of the use of 
transaction cost theory in information technology outsourcing. The Journal of Strategic 
Information Systems, 20(2), 125-138. 
 
Aubert, B.A., Patry,M. and Rivard, S. (2004). A Transaction Cost Model of IT Outsourcing, 
Information and Management 41(7): 921–932. 
 
Aubert, B., Saunders, C., Wiener, M., Denk, R., and Wolfermann, T. (2014) Embracing 
Vendor Overlaps in IT Multi-sourcing: The Case of Adidas. IAOP Research Into Practice 
Workshop, Orlando, February 
 
Bapna, R., Barua, A., Mani, D. and Mehra, A., (2010). Research commentary— Cooperation, 
coordination, and governance in multisourcing: An agenda for analytical and empirical 
research. Information Systems Research, 21(4), pp.785-795. 
 
Benbasat, I. Goldstein, D. and Mead, M. (1987). The Case Research Strategy in Studies of 
Information Systems, MIS Quarterly, 11(3):368-387. 
 
Bhattacharya, S., Gupta, A. and Hasija, S., (2012). Single sourcing versus multisourcing: The 




Carson, S. Madhok, A. and Wu, T. (2006),   Uncertainty, Opportunism, and Governance: The 
Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracting, Academy of 
Management Journal, 4(5):1058-1077. 
 
Chen, A. and Bharadwaj, A. (2009). An Empirical Analysis of Contract Structures in IT 
Outsourcing, Information Systems Research 20(4): 484–506. 
 
Cullen, s., Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (2014) Outsourcing – All You Need To Know. 
(White Plume, Melbourne). 
 
Cullen, S., Seddon, P. B., & Willcocks, L. P. (2005). IT outsourcing configuration: Research 
into defining and designing outsourcing arrangements. The Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems, 14(4), 357-387.  
 
Das, T. K., & Rahman, N. (2002). Opportunism dynamics in strategic alliances. In F. J. 
Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies and alliances (pp. 89–118). Oxford: 
Elsevier Science. 
 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (1996). Risk types and inter-firm alliance structures. Journal of 
Management Studies, 33, 827–843. 
 
De Vita, G., Tekaya, A. and Wang, C. (2010). Asset Specificity’s Impact on Outsourcing 
Relationship Performance: A disaggregated analysis by buyer-supplier asset specificity 
dimensions, Journal of Business Research 63(7): 657–666. 
 
Dibbern, J., Winkler, J. and Heinzl, A. (2008). Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs 
Between Software Projects Offshored to India, MIS Quarterly 32(2): 333–366. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research, The Academy of 
Management Review 14(4): 532–550. 
 
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 21, 13–47. 
  
Goo, J., Nam, K. and Kishore, R. (2009). The Role of Service Level Agreements in 
Relational Management of Information Technology Outsourcing: An empirical study, MIS 
Quarterly 33(1): 119–145. 
 
Gopal, A. and Koka, B. (2012). The Assymetric Benefits of Relational Flexibility: Evidence 
from software development outsourcing, MIS Quarterly 36(2): 553–576. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The problem of 
embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481–510. 
 
Heiskanen, A., Newman, M., & Eklin, M. (2008). Control, trust, power, and the dynamics of 
information system outsourcing relationships: A process study of contractual software 
development. The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 17(4), 268-286. 
 
Hoetker, G. & Mellewigt, T. (2009) Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: 




Huber, T., Fischer, T., Dibbern, J. & Hirschheim, R. (2013) A process model of 
complementarity and substitution of contractual and relational governance in IS outsourcing. 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 30, 3, 81–114. 
 
Kern, T. and Willcocks, L. (2001) The Relationship Advantage: information technologies, 
sourcing and management. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
King, N. (2004). Using template analysis in the qualitative analysis of text. 2004) Essential 
guide to qualitative methods in organisational research. Sage: London. 
 
Kishore, R., Rao, H. R., Nam, K., Rajagopalan, S., & Chaudhury, A. (2003). A relationship 
perspective on IT outsourcing. Communications of the ACM, 46(12), 86-92. 
 
Koo,  Y.,  Lee,  J.N.,  Heng,  C.S.  and  Park,  J.,  (2016).  Effect  of  multi-vendor 
outsourcing on organizational learning: A social relation perspective. Information & 
Management. 
 
Kotlarsky, J. Van Fenema, P. and Willcocks, L.P. (2008) "Developing a knowledge-based 
perspective on coordination: The case of global software projects" Information & 
Management, 45(2)96-108. 
 
Lacity, M., Khan, S., Yan, A. and Willcocks, L. (2010). A Review of the IT Outsourcing 
Empirical Literature and Future Research Directions, Journal of Information Technology 
25(4): 395–433. 
 
Lacity, M., Khan, S. and Yan, A.  (2016). Review of the Empirical Business Services 
Sourcing Literature: an update and future directions.   Journal of Information Technology, 31, 
3. 
 
Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (2001) Global Information Technology Outsourcing: In Search 
of Business Advantage. Wiley, Chichester. 
 
Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L., 2014. Business process outsourcing and dynamic 
innovation. Strategic Outsourcing: An International Journal, 7(1), pp.66-92. 
 
Lacity, M., Willcocks, L. and Khan, S. (2011). Beyond Transaction Cost Economics: 
Towards an Endogenous Theory of Information Technology Outsourcing, Journal of strategic 
information systems 20(2): 139–157. 
 
Levina, N., & Su, N. (2008). Global multisourcing strategy: The emergence of a supplier 
portfolio in services offshoring. Decision Sciences, 39(3), 541-570. 
 
Lioliou, E. and Zimmermann, A. (2015), Opportunistic Behavior in IT Outsourcing: Insights 
from a TCE and a Social Capital Perspective, Journal of Information Technology, 30:307-
324. 
 
Lioliou, E. Zimmermann, A. Willcocks, L.P. and Gao, L. (2014), Formal and Relational 
Governance in  IT  Outsourcing:  Substitution, Complementarity and  the Role of the 




Myers, M. D. (1995). Dialectical hermeneutics: a theoretical framework for the 
implementation of information systems. Information systems journal, 5(1), 51-70. 
 
Nalebuff, B. J., & Brandenburger, A. M. (1997). Co-opetition: Competitive and cooperative 
business strategies for the digital economy. Strategy & leadership, 25(6), 
28-33. 
 
Ouchi,  W.  (1980).  Markets,  Bureaucracies,  and  Clans,  Administrative  Science Quarterly 
25(1): 129–141. 
 
Osarenkhoe, A. (2010). A study of inter-firm dynamics between competition and 
cooperation–A  coopetition  strategy. Journal  of  Database  Marketing  &  Customer Strategy 
Management, 17(3-4), 201-221. 
 
Oshri, I., Dibbern, J., & Kotlarsky, J. (2015), “Joint Vendor Performance in Multi-sourcing 
Arrangements: The Moderating Role of the Guardian”, In Academy of Management 
Proceedings (Vol. 2015, No. 1, p. 17393). Academy of Management. 
 
Oshri, I., Kotlarsky, J. and Gerbasi, A., (2015), Strategic innovation through outsourcing: the 
role of relational and contractual governance. The Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems, 24(3), pp.203-216. 
 
Oshri, I., Kotlarsky, J.  nd  Willcocks,  L. (2011) The Handbook of Global Outsourcing and 
Offshoring. Palgrave, London 
 
Parida, V., Wincent, J. and Oghazi, P., (2016). Transaction costs theory and coordinated 
safeguards investment in R&D offshoring. Journal of Business Research, 69(5), pp.1823-
1828. 
 
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic Alliances Structuring: A game-theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of interfirm cooperation, Academy of Management Journal 36(4): 794–829. 
 
Pilling. B.K. Crosby, L.A. and Jackson, D.W. (1994), Relational bond in industrial exchange: 
An experimental test of the transaction cost economic framework, Journal of Business 
Research, 30:237-251. 
 
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T.R. (2002). Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance 
Function as Substitutes or Complements, Strategic Management Journal 23(8): 707– 725. 
 
Poston, R., Kettinger, W. and Simon, J. (2009). Managing The Vendor Set: best pricing and 
quality service in IT outsourcing. MISQ Executive, 8, 21, 45-58. 
 
Snowden, J. and Fersht, P. (2016) HFS Market Index – The ITO and BPO Market Size and 
Forecast 2016-2020. Boston; HFS Research. 
 
Thouin, M., Hoffman, J. and Ford, E. (2009). IT Outsourcing and Firm-Level Performance: 




Tiwana, A. and Bush, A. (2007). A Comparison of Transaction Cost, Agency, and 
Knowledge-Based Predictors of IT Outsourcing Decisions: A US-Japan cross-cultural field 
study, Journal of Management Information Systems 24(1): 259–300. 
  
Uzzi, B. (1996). The Sources and Consequences of Embeddeness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The network effect, American Sociological Review 61(4): 
674–698. 
Wiener, M., & Saunders, C. (2014). Forced coopetition in IT multi-sourcing. The Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, 23(3), 210-225. 
 
Willcocks, L., Cullen, S. and Craig, A. (2011). The Outsourcing Enterprise: From cost 
management to collaborative innovation, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Williamson, O.E. 
(1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1993). Opportunism and its Critics, Managerial  and  Decision Economics 
14(2): 97–107. 
 
Williamson, O.E., (1993). Calculativeness,  trust, and economic organization. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 36(1, Part 2), pp.453-486. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1998). Transaction Cost Economics: How it works; where it is headed, De 
Economist 146(1): 23–58. 
 
Williamson, O.E., (2008). Outsourcing: Transaction cost economics and supply chain 
management. Journal of supply chain management, 44(2), pp.5-16. 
 
Yin, R. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and methods, London: Sage. 
 
Zazac, E.J. and Olsen, C.P. (1993). From Transactional Cost to Transactional Value 
Analysis: Implications for the study of interorganizational strategies, Journal of Management 













































































































DUTCH case study 
Research participants 
from DUTCH
Role Number of interviews 
RP1 IT director One




RP3 Sector manager on
IT operations 
Two
RP4 IT demand manager One
RP5 Consultant One
RP6 Contract manager for
Supplier A 
Two
RP7 Contract manager for
Supplier B 
Two




















from Supplier C 
Role  
RP12 Client director One



























Level of formalization of the 
arrangement 
“We were convinced, seeing all the different outsourcing in the market at that 
moment, the only way to make it successful is when you try to establish a real 
partnership. That was our goal when we started.” RP3 (DUTCH sector 
manager on IT operations) 
 
 “If we had contracted it differently and said, ‘This is the date that you are 
responsible for migrating the services to the FMO and our prices are 
dropping at that moment’, they would get pressured…. Now all the pressure 
and the issues are with DUTCH, not with our vendors…. They have all the 
reasons for some time to stay in the PMO (present mode of operation) or 
PMO Plus instead of moving to the Future Mode of Operations… So, 
basically, there is not a natural alignment of incentives…. From a 
contractual perspective, we did not establish the proper incentive to move to 






























“And when you are outsourcing, you should know what you need 
functionally and ask your provider to do it... And we had a catalogue with 
services which was really far from complete... We should have been more 
accurate because if you outsource garbage, you get garbage back.” RP1 
(DUTCH IT Director) 
  
“DUTCH wants everything as a specialty, really everything has a high 
priority and it’s not standardized.  We contracted PDC where all our 
products are designed, because we wanted to take standard products from 
Supplier B and Supplier C.  The ink wasn’t even dry and we had a specialty.”  
RP7 (Contract manager for Supplier B) 
 
 
“When we outsourced our workspace management systems... we did this too 
fast and there were a lot of things that we did not know how they worked and 
we were asking the supplier to explain to us, while it should be the other way 
around... This meant that we were actually not in control... ”  RP1 (DUTCH 
IT Director) 
  
“We had not properly invested in the environment that we were moving to the 
vendors. We did not have the proper assessment levels, maintenance levels 
and we did not know what we were outsourcing to them. Consequently, in the 
first phase of the contract there was the verification phase. And what 




















Ease of performance 
measurement 
tell us?”  RP1 (DUTCH IT Director) 
  
“If you are not capable of explaining your challenges as an IT business to the 
primary business of DUTCH itself as customers, you are always in reaction 
mode. This is a major challenge for DUTCH.”  RP4 (DUTCH IT demand 
manager) 
  
“You (have) got a very kaleidoscopic IT world within DUTCH itself which 
is relatively unmanageable. If you want to outsource that… it really becomes 
a mess.”  RP13 (Contract manager from Supplier C) 
 
“DUTCH is not one customer. DUTCH is a group of customers with their 
own history…. And these customers do not always concur with what one part 
of the company has thought and what DUTCH has contracted.”  RP8 
(Contract manager for Supplier C) 
 
 
“They did not know how much hardware they had in their data centers. The 
contract was signed for 120 million over five years and it turns out to be 200 
million… Storage is the bigger part of the contract and they miscalculated by 
an enormous percentage. DUTCH IT merged with Interpolis and because 
they were going to outsource they did not pay attention to the merger… They 
thought it is going to happen in the outsourcing and they did not look at the 
south of Holland. So they did not know their numbers.” RP10 (Supplier A 
Engagement manager)  
 
“We saw an SLA performance of 50% and Supplier B was saying ‘it looks 
like 50%, but there is this... and this... and this... and they spoke it up to 80%, 
which is the minimum performance they should achieve.” RP7 (Contract 
manager for Supplier B) 
 
“We said the performance had to be 80%.  We show them the rating and it 
was 70%... They were always saying to us 70% is not correct... it is actually 
85%’... So we are not talking about how we can get the performance to a 
higher level, but we are talking about the rating.” RP9 (Outsourcing 




Predictability of behavior 
 
 
“We did not want one single supplier. We wanted three suppliers because we 
did not want to lock in on one supplier… So we said ‘Let’s divide our 
infrastructure into three parts and have one supplier for data center, one for 
network and one for office automation… and on each of these parts we tried 
to see which is our main supplier where we had the best relationship with.” 
RP3 (DUTCH Sector manager on IT operations) 
 
 
“Supplier A was already in place because we had already outsourced our 
mainframe with them. We already had an experience with Supplier A in an 
outsourcing way of thinking… Supplier B was our connectivity partner… a 
large part of the network was already in the hands of Supplier B. Thus, we 
had a large understanding with Supplier B…. So Supplier A very logical, 
Supplier B logical -while also we did not have any outsourcing experience 
with them-… Supplier C really to be honest… a bit strange… I am not sure 
where that came from… I know we did business with them but from my point 
of view, we did not do business with them on the workstations until then… So 
that was actually a rather strange decision afterwards... I am not sure who 





 “I believe that they see us as one of their customers… Just a customer 
because they have bigger customers. So we are one of their customers. That 
is how it feels.” RP7 (DUTCH Contract manager for Supplier B).   
  
 
 
